ḤeshbonCenter on Data and Jewish Life
Season 1Leadership Pay
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Empirical research · 140 schools · 2017–2024

The fastest-growing schools in the sector are the ones cutting their leaders’ pay.

Nonprofit pay theory says compensation follows size and growth. Orthodox and Chareidi schools grew revenue faster than any other group here — 7.7% to 8.4% a year. Executive pay at those same schools grew about 1%. Set against 3.71% inflation, that is not a small raise. It is a cut, taken year after year, by nobody’s decision.

140schools
579school-year records
124in growth panel
2017–24filing years
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The belief
Big institutions pay big salaries. That is supposed to be a law.

It is the most durable result in the study of nonprofit pay. Compensation tracks organizational size. Bigger budget, bigger job, bigger number. The reasoning is not lazy. A school with twice the revenue has twice the payroll to run and twice the families to answer to. The job really is larger.

Boards behave as though they believe it. A compensation review pulls figures from organizations of comparable size, and the question in the room is always some version of what do schools our size pay?

So growth ought to carry pay behind it. An institution whose revenue climbs eight percent a year has a leadership job getting harder every year and a growing ability to pay for it. Both arrows point the same way.

The logic is sound. It also contains a step nobody says out loud. It assumes an organization that can pay more will pay more. That capacity and decision are one thing.

They are not one thing. And where they come apart, they come apart quietly.

How it works
The raise arrived. The grocery number never moved.

A household’s income climbs for six straight years. A promotion, a second earner, a good stretch. By the end they are earning considerably more than they were.

The weekly grocery spend does not change. Not because anyone decided to hold it down. Because the grocery spend was never a decision. It is the number this family hands over at the till. It is what groceries cost, in the only sense that phrase means anything in a house.

Meanwhile food gets more expensive. Same number at the till, less in the trolley. A little less each year.

Now try to catch it happening. Any single week, nothing is wrong. The number is the number, the receipt is unremarkable, and there is no moment at which anyone chose to eat less.

You can only see it by stacking the years. That is the entire shape of this finding. Capacity rose. The habit did not. And the gap between them does not appear in any one year’s accounts, because in any one year it is worth about two and a half percent.

Two words that sound the same
A one percent raise. A pay cut.

Nearly every figure in this story is a growth rate, and growth rates are where the argument lives. So two conventions before the data.

Nominal and real A nominal raise is the number on the letter. A real raise is what survives once prices are subtracted. Consumer prices rose 3.71% a year across this window. So a 1% raise is not a modest raise. It leaves the person about 2.7 points worse off than the year before — and it does it again the year after that.

There are two reasonable bars a salary can be asked to clear, and this story uses both. Consumer prices ask whether the paycheck still buys what it bought. The Employment Cost Index for private-industry wages asks a different question: whether the job kept up with what employers generally paid for labour over the same years. That ran 3.88% a year. Clearing one bar and missing the other would be a genuinely ambiguous result. Nothing here clears either.

What is being measured Every figure is a median — the middle school, not the average, which a handful of very large institutions would drag upward. And every figure is the total reported compensation of the single highest-paid individual at the school, as filed on Schedule J of the Form 990.
The shape of it
Revenue up 8% a year. Pay up 1%.

Orthodox and Chareidi schools recorded the fastest institutional revenue growth of any group in the study, and the slowest executive compensation growth of any group, over exactly the same years. Both facts come from the same schools and the same filings. This is not one group set against another. It is one set of institutions set against itself.

Revenue growth, Orthodox/Chareidi
7.7–8.4% / yr
The fastest institutional growth of any group in the sample.
Compensation growth, same schools
0.75–1.25% / yr
The slowest pay growth of any group, over the same years.
Compensation growth vs labor-market benchmarksAnnualized rates
01 — The bar to clear

Two ways of asking whether pay kept up.

Consumer prices rose 3.71% a year across the window. Private-sector wages rose 3.88%.

The first is a question about a life. Does the paycheck still buy what it used to? The second is a question about a market. Is this job falling behind other jobs?

02 — It cleared neither

Across the whole sector, real executive pay fell.

Median executive compensation grew 2.9% to 3.2% a year. Under the price line. Under the wage line.

The shortfall is small — well under a point a year. Small enough that nobody in the room would have called it a cut. Seven years of it still leaves the average school’s leadership poorer than when it started.

03 — Now hold the benchmarks aside

One percent, against eight.

At Orthodox and Chareidi schools compensation grew about 1% a year, while revenue at those same schools grew close to 8%.

Against 3.71% inflation, one percent is a real cut of roughly 2.7 points a year. The schools with the most new money moving through them are the schools whose leaders lost the most ground.

Communal schools, growing more slowly, came closest to the textbook pattern. The relationship here is not weak. It runs backwards.

Median top-earner compensation by denominationLevels
04 — Levels

Look at the levels and nothing is wrong at all.

Median top-earner compensation runs from about $193,000 at Orthodox and Chareidi schools to roughly $243,000 at Communal and Modern Orthodox schools.

This is the textbook picture. Bigger institutions pay more. A board reading this table would conclude the market is working.

05 — Growth

The theory survives the level and dies on the change.

A level is a snapshot. It says where a school sits this year, and it is the number every compensation committee looks at.

Growth is the other question. Here the levels sit roughly where size would put them, and the growth runs against growth. So the pattern is invisible to precisely the instrument boards use. Nobody benchmarks their own trajectory.

Capacity and custom are not the same thing. Revenue growth only measures one of them.

Eight percent a year says a school could pay more. It says nothing whatsoever about whether it will. The field has been reading the first number as though it answered the second.

Compensation as a share of school revenueFalling since 2020
06 — The other side of the ledger

The institution grew. The leadership line shrank.

Median top-earner compensation as a share of same-year school revenue has fallen steadily since 2020 — from 2.42% in 2017 to 1.74% in 2023.

Same finding, read from the institution’s books rather than an individual’s paycheck. Revenue expanded. The leadership line did not expand with it. On a growing base, holding a salary roughly flat shows up here as a share falling by more than a quarter.

No single year in that series looks like a decision. Stacked, they are one.

Revenue growth tells you what an institution can afford. It tells you nothing about what it believes leadership ought to cost.
The separation this data forces
The move this data forces
Two things the field keeps calling one thing.

“Pay follows growth” bundles two things that can come apart.

Capacity is what an institution could pay: the revenue, the headroom, the money moving through the accounts. The norm is what it does pay — the shared, largely unspoken sense in a community of what a school of this kind gives the person who runs it.

Revenue growth measures the first with some precision. It measures the second not at all.

In most of the economy the two move together, which is why they get treated as one number. An employer who can pay more has to, because underpaid staff leave. The market drags the norm along behind the capacity. Where a communal norm sets the price of leadership instead, that link is cut.

Capacity
7.7–8.4% / yr
What the institution could pay. Visible in every filing, and rising fast.
The norm
0.75–1.25% / yr
What the institution does pay. Not visible in any filing, and barely moving.

That is what the Orthodox and Chareidi figures describe. Not a sector that failed to grow. A sector that grew faster than anyone else in the study and passed essentially none of it into the leadership line.

Where this leaves a board
A cut nobody took. And nobody can see.

A compensation review looks at a level and a peer set. Both look fine here. $193,338 is not a scandalous figure, and the comparison schools are not far above it. What the review never surfaces is the trajectory. No committee sits down with seven years of its own decisions expressed in real terms.

The instrument is a snapshot. The finding is a slope. That is how this ran for seven years inside institutions that were watching carefully.

It matters which it is. A deliberate communal position — that leadership of a religious school should be modestly paid, and the money belongs in classrooms — is a legitimate choice, and one worth defending in public. Seven unremarkable years accumulating into the same result is not a choice at all, and the people who bore it did so without anyone deciding they should.

This data cannot tell those apart. Restraint, norm or drift — none appears in a tax filing. What the filings establish is that the gap is real, it is large, and it points the opposite way from the field’s own theory. Pay follows growth is not wrong here. It is simply not a description of this sector.

What this analysis cannot say

Four limits worth carrying with the finding.

A pattern, not a cause

This is a correlation: two things that move together across the same schools. It shows that denominational affiliation and compensation trajectory line up. It identifies no mechanism, and the word “norm” in this piece is an interpretation, not a measurement.

Inferred denomination

No federal filing records religious movement. Classification here rests on curated lists, naming conventions and individual verification. Some schools will be placed wrongly.

Large filers only

Schedule J detail exists only for schools filing the full Form 990. Smaller schools are absent entirely, so this describes the larger end of the sector and nothing below it.

Uneven year coverage

2024 filings are too thin to report reliably, which is why the growth window ends in 2023. The Other category holds too few schools to represent anything.

Ḥeshbon — Center on Data and Jewish Life

A data project on how Jewish life is paid for. The work comes in seasons. This page is part of Season 1 — Jewish Education. It states its own sources, sample sizes and limits.

Ahead: Season 2 — Household Affordability · Season 3 — Federation & Charitable Giving

More in Season 1

 

Working prototype. Every figure comes from the underlying research. Where a chart simplifies a published result, the page says so. Nothing here audits an individual school.